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Pressing the Flesh: Exploring a Tension in the Study of the 
Embodied, Embedded Mind*. 
 
Andy Clark 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
 
Much ink has lately been spilled in the name of Embodied 
Cognition. Mind itself, we are now frequently told, is an 
intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded 
phenomenon. But there is a prima facie tension, or so I shall 
argue, between two strands of thought prominent in this recent 
literature. One of those strands depicts the fine details of a 
creature’s embodiment as a major constitutive constraint on the 
nature of its mind: a kind of new–wave body–centrism. The other 
depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal–partners 
dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind 
fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended 
functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple 
realizability than ever before). Where some theorists of 
embodiment see the contribution of the flesh as both special and 
at least partially constitutive of certain mental states, some 
theorists of embedding see the contribution as instrumental, with 
the body acting as the contingent bridge to new forms of extended 
functional (computational and representational) organization. The 
main goal of the present paper is to display this subterranean 
tension. Along the way, I isolate some specific cases for which a 
constitutive relation between embodiment and mentality seems 
most plausible, and begin to scout the space of possible ways of 
reconciling the two approaches. More positively, but rather 
speculatively, the paper ends by depicting the body itself as 
whatever plays a certain role in a (possibly extended) functional 
organization.  This delivers a clear account of why the body 
matters, but may require some revisions in our common 
understanding of the space of possible embodied intelligences. 
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1. Embodiment and Embedding: The Very Ideas 
 
Recent years have seen an explosion of work, both in philosophy 
and across the many sub–disciplines of Cognitive Science, that is 
now typically glossed as belonging to the investigation of the mind 
as 'embodied and environmentally embedded'i. The phrase ‘mind 
as embodied and embedded’ seems to have been coined by John 
Haugeland in a similarly titled paper that was circulating widely 
in the early 1990’sii and that later appeared as Haugeland (1998)). 
There, Haugeland writes that: 
 
“If we are to understand mind as the locus of intelligence, we 
cannot follow Descartes in regarding it as separable in 
principle from the body and the world…Broader approaches, 
freed of that prejudicial commitment, can look again at 
perception and action, at skillful involvement with public 
equipment and social organization, and see not principled 
separation but all sorts of close coupling and functional 
unity… Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately 
embodied and intimately embedded in its world.”  
Haugeland (1998) p. 236–237 
 
Intimacy, however, is a famously slippery beast. What claim or 
claims concerning the role and importance of the body and the 
environment lie at the centre of recent work on the embodied, 
embedded mind? In recent years, some of the many projects 
developed under this broad banner have included: work on 
externalism and the nature of psychological explanation ( Wilson 
(2004)); work on 'active externalism' and the extended mind 
(Clark and Chalmers (1998); work on 'sensorimotor accounts of 
perception' (O'Regan and Noë (2001)); work on environment–
involving accounts of perception, memory, thought and language 
(Rowlands (1999); work on the interdependence of conscious 
perception and action (Hurley (1998); work on deictic pointers and 
active vision (Ballard et al (1997); and work on the 
complementarity between biological and technological resources 
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(Clark (2003). Given this surface diversity, it seems fair to ask 
what, if anything, forms the deep theoretical core of the embodied, 
embedded approach? 
 
It helps, at the outset, to put aside some possible readings that are 
simply trivial or uninteresting. For example, it is obvious enough 
that the concept of chair in some way reflects facts about the kinds 
of shape that happen to afford (typical human) sitting. It is also 
obvious that much daily thought and reason is informed by what 
we sense and what we do, and that sensings and doings are 
paradigmatically embodied acts. Creatures with very different 
bodies to our own won’t (ceteris paribus– and more on that later) 
be prone to think quite the same things in the same circumstances 
as us. Or take ‘knowing how to row’. Knowing how to row, for the 
average human being, involves knowing how to do certain things 
with oars and with your arms and legs. What is known is not just 
how to row, but (if you will) how to row using tools like this and a 
body like this. None of this is particularly interesting, either as 
philosophy or science. The question is whether attention to details 
of embodiment and embedding contributes something important 
and previously unexpected to an understanding of mind and 
reason, not whether it contributes at all.  
 
One way, though probably not the only way, to unpack this idea of 
embodiment as contributing something 'important and 
unexpected' is to depict bodily structures or bodily actions as 
somehow constitutively involved in the determination of aspects of 
our mental life. Ned Block (personal communication, and see also 
Block (2001)) suspects that in many cases the actual contribution 
of the body and world is causal rather than constitutive. He thus 
accuses many of the research programs gathered under the 
'embodied, embedded' banner of committing what he dubs a 
'causal/constitutive error'. In what follows, I shall develop two 
(mutually consistent) responses to this worry. The first is to point 
out some ways in which 'merely' causal involvement might itself 
reveal unexpected and interesting things about the mind. The 
second is to point to an important but restricted range of cases 
where the strong constitutive claim seems at least prima facie 
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plausible. Given this strategy, it might reasonably be objected that 
despite being a staple of contemporary philosophical exposition, 
the causal/constitutive distinction itself is by no means 
unproblematic. I agree that this is so, but think that the general 
challenge (which is simply to say more about the nature of the 
putative role of embodiment and embedding) is nonetheless a fair 
one. For present purposes, then, I hope we can rest content with a 
fairly simple gloss according to which the core distinction is 
between the body (or embodied action) acting as a mere causal 
factor, channeling and timing inputs and outputs in ways that (of 
course) impact the flow of experience and mental content, and the 
more challenging image of the body (or better, embodied activity) 
as somehow conceptually intertwined with specific mental 
contents or experiences themselvesiii. As we examine specific 
examples, this contrast should become increasingly clear. One 
characteristic marker of the very strongest forms of conceptual 
intertwining is that it should be strictly speaking unimaginable 
(once the cases are properly presented) that the content or 
experience remain as it is while certain key details of embodiment 
or of (perhaps merely potential) embodied action differ. Most 
importantly of all, however, we will also begin to spot some 
interesting intermediate territory, in which the details of 
embodiment, though not conceptually intertwined with mentality 
in such a strong fashion, play the important role of causally 
enabling or implementing aspects of the more abstract functional 
organizations upon which certain mental states and processes 
supervene. 
 
There is also a large complex of traditionally externalist 
philosophical theorizing that, while certainly in pursuit of richly 
constitutive claims, remains orthogonal to the concerns of (most 
ofiv) the theorists of embodiment and embedding. Such 
philosophical externalism concerns the constitutive role that an 
embedding environment plays in determining the content of some 
(or perhaps even all) mental states. But that determination is, in a 
certain sense, merely semantic. In such cases, the external 
features are thought to play a role in fixing meanings, but do not 
appear as part of the local computational and bodily mechanisms 
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driving environmentally engaged action. By contrast, most 
theorists of embodiment and embedding focus on ways in which 
features of the body, of embodied action, or of the environment 
may play an activev. information processing role (a clear example 
is Haugeland's (1998) appeal to the role of the actual road in an 
agent's 'knowing the way to San Jose').  
 
Having put the trivial and the orthogonal matters aside, what 
other claim or claims concerning the nature and importance of 
embodiment and embedding are to be found? Some recent 
attempts to sort and distinguish various claims and options 
include M. Wilson's (2002) six–way classification and Shapiro’s 
(2004) three–way divisionvi. I propose, however, to be rather less 
delicate than either of these and simply to highlight (what seem to 
me to be) two rather different central claims that organize and 
inform the bulk of this recent literature. 
 
The first claim is that the body can be the instrument by means of 
which we create larger functional (computational and 
representational) wholes, upon which aspects of mind can properly 
supervene. Call this Extended Functionalism (EF). 
 
The second claim is that the specific details of human 
embodiment, embedding or embodied action make a direct, active 
and in some sense constitutive contribution to at least some of our 
mental states and properties. Call this the Constitutive 
Contribution Claim (CCC) 
 
The two stories (I hesitate to call them theses at this early stage of 
philosophical and scientific investigation) are, at least as stated, 
mutually consistent and even superficially quite similar. The first, 
EF, claims that, courtesy of our capacities of embodied action, 
larger systemic wholes, incorporating brains, bodies, the motion of 
sense organs, and (under some conditions) the information–
bearing states of non–biological props and aids, may sometimes 
constitute the mechanistic supervenience base for specific mental 
states and processes. The second, CCC, claims that specific 
features of our embodiment are somehow conceptually implicated 
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the explanation of certain mental states. But despite the 
superficial similarities (each claims that body and world may play 
a profound and active role in human cognition) these two stories 
are both distinct and may, in certain circumstances, come into 
conflict. Revealing and exploring this hidden tension is the main 
aim of the present paper. 
 
2. On (Principled) Body–Centrism 
 
Let’s take the second story (the one about a constitutive 
contribution) first. There are various ways to try to make this 
case, but I’ll consider only three. The first appeals to the general 
role of embodied action in sensing and processing, the second to its 
role in the determination of certain rather specific forms of 
conscious experience, and the third to its role in limning the space 
of thought and reason. 
 
Shapiro (2004)vii pursues the first of these routes as part of an 
argument against what he dubs the separability thesis (ST).  
According to ST a humanlike mind could perfectly well exist in a 
very nonhumanlike body. Against ST, Shapiro urges us to 
embrace what he calls the embodied mind thesis (EMT) which 
holds that “minds profoundly reflect the bodies in which they are 
contained” (op cit p.167).  
 
Why reject ST? One reason, Shapiro tells us, turns on quite basic 
facts about sensing and processing. Human vision, for example, 
involves a great deal of sensor movement. We move our heads to 
gain information about the relative distances of objects, since 
nearer objects will (courtesy of parallax effects) appear to move 
the most. Such movements, Shapiro argues, are not simply an aid 
to vision. They are part and parcel of the visual processing itself. 
They are “as much a part of vision as the detection of disparity or 
the calculation of shape from shading” (op cit p.188). Similar 
points can be made about audition and the placement of the ears 
on the head. Rebutting the suggestion that this is merely to state 
the obvious dependence of perceptual processes on bodily 
structure, Shapiro comments that: 
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“The point is deeper–that psychological processes are 
incomplete without the body’s contributions. Vision for 
human beings is a process that includes features of the 
human body. [ ] This means that a description of various 
perceptual capacities cannot maintain body–neutrality and 
it also means that an organism with a non–human body will 
have non–human visual and auditory psychologies” Shapiro 
(2004) p.190 
 
Body–neutrality, for Shapiro, is the idea that “characteristics of 
bodies make no difference to the kind of mind one possesses” and 
is associated with the idea that “mind is a program that can be 
characterized in abstraction from the kind of body/brain that 
realizes it” (both quotes op cit p.175). Work on the role of bodily 
movements in visual processing suggests, according to Shapiro, 
that body–neutrality fails and that human–style vision requires a 
human–style body. As I read it, the force of this claim must be at 
least that  'human–style' vision and 'human–style' embodiment 
stand in some relation that is more than contingent. Our kind of 
seeing, understood as a psychological process, requires, or at any 
rate profoundly involves (see note 11 for some caveats) our kind of 
body.  
 
Another body (sic) of research that appears to contest claims of 
body–neutrality, at least regarding the contents of perceptual 
awareness, is spearheaded by Alva Noë and Kevin O’Regan, and 
forms part of the development of an ‘enactive’ (see Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991)) approach to perception.  The central 
claim is that perception is nothing other than implicit knowledge 
of so–called ‘sensorimotor contingencies’, that is to say, knowledge 
of the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. The point is not 
that (trivially) what we see depends on what we do, but that 
seeing itself is all about our implicit knowledge of the likely effects 
of our own bodily motions (especially motions of the sensors). 
Space precludes a full rehearsal of this rich and challenging view, 
but the conclusions bear repeating: 
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“If perception is in part constituted by our possession and 
exercise of bodily skills…then it may also depend on our 
possession of the sorts of bodies that can encompass those 
skills, for only a creature with such a body could have those 
skills. To perceive like us, it follows, you must have a body 
like ours.” (Noë (2004) p.25) 
 
There is no doubt, in this case, concerning the intended 
constitutive force of the story. But the waters become muddied 
when Noë offers an immediate illustration of this claim. As we 
take off in an airplane, Noë notes, it can look as if the nose lifts up 
relative to our field of vision. But this is not so, since we are (of 
course) rising in perfect synchrony with the plane. The nose lifts, 
but not relative to our visual plane! The illusion occurs because 
our vestibular system detects the alteration in bodily orientation, 
and this information impacts our visual experience. According to 
Noë: 
 
"..the example illustrates the way the character of our visual 
experience depends on our embodiment, that is, on 
idiosyncratic aspects of our sensory implementation"  
(op cit p.27) 
 
This example, however, fails to do justice to the sensorimotor 
story. For while the example certainly illustrates an idiosyncratic 
contribution of sensory implementation, it does not seem, on the 
face of it, to be tracking any plausibly constitutive connection. 
 
O'Regan and Noë (2001, p.941) offer another, more central, 
example, this time of a non–illusory nature. It concerns the 
experience of seeing a long straight horizontal line. This 
experience involves, according to O'Regan and Noë, knowledge of 
the peculiar sensorimotor contingencies characteristic of an eye 
like mine, with a spherically shaped retina, encountering such a 
line. Thus: 
 
"If you are looking at the midpoint of a horizontal line, the 
line will trace out a great arc on the inside of your eyeball. If 
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you now switch your fixation point upwards the curvature of 
the line will change. Represented on a flattened–our retina 
the line would now be curved. In general, straight lines on 
the retina distort dramatically as the eyes move.." 
O'Regan and Noë (2001, p.941) 
 
O'Regan and Noë's interesting suggestion is that far from 
presenting a problem in need of fixing downstream, such 
signature effects provide the means by which we actually 
recognize the line as being visually presented and as being 
straight and horizontal. My experience of seeing the line as 
horizontal, according to O'Regan and Noë, is thus partially built 
out of my implicit knowledge of the various contingencies linking 
specific bodily (or ocular) actions to new sensory inputs.  
 
Another such contingency concerns what happens if we move our 
eyes along a long horizontal line rather than perpendicular to it. 
As we move along, the set of photoreceptors stimulated on the eye 
remains the same (as the line is self–similar under translation). 
Now, the retinal (and indeed the cortical) representation does not 
change. This 'law of sensorimotor invariance', unlike the previous 
one, tracks an intrinsic property of straight lines and would apply 
regardless of the details of different sensory organs and wiring 
diagrams (op cit p.942). Even a being with a corrugated or 
otherwise differently shaped retina would, O'Regan and Noë 
observe, be subject to this invariance in input signals deriving 
from sideways visual motion along an endless horizontal line. 
Conscious visual experience, the authors repeatedlyviii claim, is 
constituted by our implicit knowledge of both kinds of 
sensorimotor contingency.  
 
Noë (2004) offers, as a more general implication of the  
sensorimotor approach, the idea that: 
 
 
"what determines phenomenology is not neural activity set 
up by stimulation as such, but the way the neural activity is 
embedded in a sensorimotor dynamic"  
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Noë (2004) p.227 
 
That this is not merely a claim of contingent causal connection is 
suggested by the passage that then follows: 
 
"Experience is not caused by and realized in the brain, 
although it depends causally on the brain. Experience is 
realized in the active life of the skillful animal. A 
neuroscience of perceptual consciousness must be an 
enactive neuroscience–that is, a neuroscience of embodied 
activity, rather than a neuroscience of brain activity"  
Noë (2004) p. 226 
 
If experience is indeed "realized in the active life of the skilful 
animal", the connection between that skilful life and experience is 
intimate indeed. For the skilful life of embodied action emerges as 
quite literally part of what makes the experience the way it is. 
 
For my own part (though I shall not try to argue for this here) I 
am not yet convinced that the case has thus been made for any 
fully general version of this apparently constitutive claim. The 
sense in which knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies might 
here be said to 'constitute' our knowledge of e.g. the visual 
appearance of straight horizontal lines seems rather to be the 
sense in which brains like ours might be said to encode 
information about (visual) straightness and horizontality by 
means of encoding information about the various (both intrinsic 
and body–relative) signature contingencies. But that sounds like a 
claim about how certain kinds of knowledge may in fact become 
available to (the brains of) certain kinds of embodied beings: it 
thus looks more like a claim about implementation than about the 
conceptual intertwining of features of embodiment and of mindix. 
 
There exist, however, a special range of cases, concerning specific 
kinds of conscious experience, for which a strongly constitutive 
claim seems quite persuasive. We can introduce them by means of 
a simple thought experiment. 
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Try to imagine a creature whose conscious experience presents 
them with an upside down world, but whose motor routines are so 
neatly tweaked and tuned that their physical engagements with 
the world always go off without a hitch. Imagine, moreover, that 
they these beings are so familiar with their own motoric eloquence 
that they are never surprised that their actions work out. Imagine 
too that all their episodes of planning and imagination have come 
to be as well integrated with motoric action as our own, enabling 
them, for example, to plan and execute complex climbs on 
mountainsides and indoor training walls, and whatever else you 
would accept as proof of some proper inter–animation between 
conscious reason and successful action. Now ask yourself: can you 
really imagine that these beings experience their world as 'upside 
down'? 
 
Skill–based accounts of conscious perception provide a powerful 
framework in which to press a negative response. At the heart of 
such approaches is the simple but compelling idea that in certain 
cases the way we consciously perceive the world is intimately, 
rather than merely contingently, tied up with routines for (or 
behavioural dispositions towards) engaging the world by deed and 
action. One obvious advantage of appealing to behavioural 
dispositions rather than actual actions is to allow a contingently 
inactive (perhaps paralyzed or temporarily incapacitated) agent to 
enjoy the same range of sensory experiences. Such models remain 
motocentric in a sufficiently strong sense, since they make 
(certain) conscious contents conceptually inextricable from the 
potential (which need not be actualized) for embodied action. 
 
Perhaps, then, there is a distinctive range of cases for which 
something like a motocentric constitutive connection can be made 
plausible. In particular, such a connection seems especially 
plausible for the case of spatial content and spatial awareness. 
Thus Mandik (1999) argues for what he  terms the 'behavioral 
constituency of perceptual space'. This is the idea that our 
egocentric experience of space is conceptually intertwined with our 
possession of various bodies of behavioural know–how. For 
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example, following remarks by Pitcher (1970), Mandik comments 
that: 
 
"We just cannot imagine hearing a sound coming from a 
particular direction while simultaneously not knowing how 
to orient (or point, or walk..) toward the direction from which 
the sound seems to originate" 
Mandik (1999) p. 53 
 
Similar intuitions are pumped in Evans (1985), Taylor (1979) and 
Grush (1998). Evans, for example, writes that: 
 
"Auditory input, or rather the complex property of auditory 
input which codes the direction of the sound, acquires a 
spatial content for an organism by being linked with 
behavioural output" 
Evans (1985) p.385 
 
Grush goes on to develop a lovely example concerning the 
perception of a sound as pulsating. The claim is that: 
 
"part of the normal content of pulsatingness, for us, is that it 
is something with which we can co–ordinate a number of 
sensorimotor skills" Grush (1998) para. 21 
 
Thus suppose we hear the sound of a siren as pulsating. Then that 
perception, Grush argues, poises us to exercise a battery of skills. 
We might wave a hand, tap a finger, or nod our head in time with 
the pulses. The total failure of an embodied agent to be able to 
bring any such skills to bear is, Grush argues, incompatible with 
the idea that that agent actually perceives the sound as pulsating 
(though she may know it to be pulsating by some other means). 
Intrinsic to the perceptual auditory content then, is something 
that puts that content in touch with dispositions towards various 
kinds of embodied actions. It is a natural (though admittedly 
additional) step to suggest that what it is to perceive the sound as 
pulsating just is for such links to be in place. 
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As an aside, it might be thought that work on the so–called 'dual 
visual systems hypothesis' (Milner and Goodale (1995 )) puts 
pressure on the idea of a constitutive motocentric link for any 
form of visual consciousness. This is because such work depicts 
conscious vision as depending on a set of neural resources that 
operate semi-independently of those that support fine visuo–motor 
control. But this, I think (and see Clark (1999) (2001)) is a 
mistake. For all the motocentric model requires is that the kind of 
spatial contents available to conscious thinking and reasoning are 
conceptually bound up with an agent's dispositions to engage a 
spatially presented world. If the success of those engagements also 
requires the proper operation of multiple other subsystems (e.g. 
the dorsal stream), this fact is additional to (perhaps even 
orthogonal to) the constitutive claim itself.  
 
 
I shall not attempt to further pursue these issues here, since the 
point was merely to illustrate a specific range of cases, concerning 
spatial awareness, where a genuinely constitutive connection 
between motoric dispositions and conscious contents seems 
suggested by reflection on our ordinary thought and practice. 
Although this is indeed a limited case, it is worth flagging the 
possibility that some kind of broadly skill–based account may 
apply much more generally, perhaps covering all cases of 
conscious awareness and 'qualia'. Such an extension is explicitly 
argued for in Noë (2004), where sensorimotor considerations are 
invoked for experiences of shape, color and perceptual contents of 
all stripes. Such a general extension gains in plausibility, 
however, if we drop the requirement that the skills in question be 
essentially or crucially sensorimotor in nature, and allow instead 
that many will concern passive acts of recognition, of matching to 
samples, etc. (For a nice treatment of appearances of colour 
couched in these terms, where the emphasis is on 'sifting, sorting, 
tracking and judging' rather than on motor engagements per se, 
see Pettit  2003). 
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Finally, I should briefly mention a third, and very different way of 
arguing for CCC. This route appeals to considerations of the role 
of the body in structuring human concepts. The locus classicus 
here is Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) work on the role of 
body–based metaphors in human thought and reason. Many of our 
basic concepts, they argue, are quite evidently body–based: 
concepts like front and back, up and down, inside and outside: 
 
“If all beings on the planet were uniform stationary spheres 
floating in some medium and perceiving equally in all 
directions, they would have no concepts of front and back” 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) p.34 
 
But these basic concepts, they go on to argue, end up structuring 
our understandings (and our inferences) in more rarefied domains. 
Happiness and sadness, to take the standard example, are 
conceived in terms of upness and downness. The specifics of 
human embodiment thus shape the basic concepts that in turn 
inform (so it is argued) all the rest. Perhaps then: 
 
Organisms that didn’t have bodies like our own would 
develop other metaphors to characterize happiness and 
sadness. Happy and sad would be structured in other ways 
and would thus assume different meaningsx. 
Shapiro (2004) p.201 
 
 
The common upshot of all these arguments, then, is a kind of 
principled body– or action–centrism, according to which the 
presence of humanlike minds depends quite directlyxi upon either 
the possession of a humanlike bodyxii or (more weakly but still 
significantly) on the disposition to engage in certain distinctive 
patterns of embodied action. 
 
3. Extended Functionalism 
 
It is revealing, I think, that Shapiro’s spirited defense of profound 
bodilyxiii involvement in the mental comes in the larger context of 
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a series of arguments aimed at a different, logically independent 
but thematically related, target. That target was the thesis of 
multiple realizability: a staple of non–reductionist Philosophy of 
Mind ever since the heady days of early Machine Functionalism. 
At about that time, the notion that minds like ours might be 
directly identified with their specific neural underpinnings was 
widely cast as a kind of unacceptable meat or species chauvinism, 
and replaced by the identification of mind as a functional kind, 
capable in principle of being realized by many different physical 
substrates (Putnam (1975)– see also Putnam (1960), (1967)). In 
this new regime, mindware stood to neural hardware as software 
stood to the physical device. Just as the same software could turn 
up on different bedrock machines (as when a PC and a Mac both 
run Windows), so the same kinds of mind might, it was supposed, 
turn up in various kinds of material form. What mattered was not 
the bedrock physical forms so much as the abstract patterns of 
input–to–internal–state– transitions– to–output that the material 
structures were able to support. Sameness at this rather abstract 
level was meant to guarantee sameness at the mental level. Or at 
any rate, any remaining slack was to be taken up by rather arcane 
details of history and/or distal environmental embedding. As far 
as the machinery of mind itself was concerned, functional identity 
fully fixed any contribution to mentality. 
 
Shapiro’s appeal to work in embodied, embedded cognitive science 
depicts it as in spirit rather inimicalxiv to the platform–neutral 
machine functionalist model of mind. But there is a way of 
understanding the embodied, embedded approach that sees it as 
extending, rather than undermining, a broadly functionalist story. 
To bring this possibility into focus, we must next sample the kinds 
of argument that favour what we earlier dubbed EF– for Extended 
Functionalism. 
 
Arguments in favour of EF appeal mainly, if not exclusively, to the 
computational role played by certain kinds of non–neural events 
and processes in online problem–solving. Consider, to pursue an 
example cited earlier in the text, Ballard et al’s (1997) account of 
the use of  ‘deictic pointers’ in a block–copying task. In this task, a 
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subject is given a target pattern of colored blocks that they must 
copy   by moving similar blocks from a reserve area to a new 
workspace. Using the spare blocks in the reserve area, the subject 
must recreate the pattern by moving one block at a time from the 
reserve to the new version they are creating. The task is 
performed using mouse clicks and a monitor, and the subject's eye 
motions are constantly tracked. What Ballard et al found was that 
repeated rapid saccades to the model were used in the 
performance of the task: many more than you might expect. For 
example, the model is consulted both before and after picking up a 
block, suggesting that when glancing at the model, the subject 
stores only one piece of information: either the color or the 
position of the next block to be copied. 
 
To test this hypothesis, Ballard et al used a computer program to 
alter the color of a block while the subject was looking elsewhere. 
For most of these interventions, subjects did not notice the 
changes even for blocks and locations that had been visited many 
times before, or that were the focus of the current action. The 
explanation was that when glancing at the model, the subject 
stores only one piece of information:  either the color or the 
position of the next block to be copied (not both). In other words, 
even when repeated saccades are made to the same site, very 
minimal information is retained. Instead, repeated fixations 
provide specific items of information ‘just in time’ for use. The 
conclusion from this is that: 
 
“In the block–copying paradigm… fixation appears to be 
tightly linked to the underlying processes by marking the 
location at which information (e.g., color, relative location) is 
to be acquired, or the location that specifies the target of the 
hand movement (picking up, putting down). Thus fixation 
can be seen as binding the value of the variable currently 
relevant for the task” 
Ballard et al (1997) p 734 
 
Two morals matter for the story at hand. The first is that visual 
fixation is here playing an identifiable computational role. As the 
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authors (op cit p.725) comment “changing gaze is analogous to 
changing the memory reference in a silicon computer”. The second 
is that repeated saccades to the physical model thus allow the 
subject to deploy what Ballard et al dub ‘minimal memory 
strategies’ to solve the problem. The idea is that the brain creates 
its programs so as to minimize the amount of working memory 
that is required, and that eye motions are recruited to place a new 
piece of information into memory. Indeed, by altering the task 
demands, Ballard et al were also able to systematically alter the 
particular mixes of biological memory and active, embodied 
retrieval recruited to solve different versions of the problem. They 
conclude that, in this kind of task at least, “eye movements, head 
movements, and memory load trade off against each other in a 
flexible way” (op cit p.732) 
 
The Ballard et al model is a clean example of an extended 
functional approach. It analyses a cognitive task as a sequence of 
less intelligent sub–tasks, using recognizable computational and 
information–processing concepts, but applies those concepts 
within a larger organizational whole.  It recognizes the profound 
contributions that embodiment and environmental embedding 
make to the solution of the problem, and displays those 
contributions rather clearly, by identifying the abstract role of 
specific (both gross–bodily and neural) operations in real–time 
performance of the task. The authors are fully aware of this, 
commenting that their model “strongly suggests a functional view 
of visual computation where different operations are applied at 
different stages during a complex task” (op cit p. 735). As a result, 
a Ballard–style approach is able: 
 
 
“To combine the concept that looking is a form of doing with 
the claim that vision is computation [integrating the two 
points by] introducing the idea that eye movements 
constitute a form of deictic coding…that allow perceivers to 
exploit the world as a kind of external storage device” Wilson 
(2004) p.176–177 
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Bodily actions are thus part of the means by which certain 
computational and representational operations are implemented. 
But what makes the cognitive process the one that it is is simply 
its functional profile (the set of state transitions mediating input 
and output). The difference is just that this functional profile 
belongs not to the neural system and its inputs and outputs alone, 
but to the whole embodied system located in the world. We thus 
have a version of what Block (1990, p.70) calls 'long–arm 
functionalism' viz functional roles that "reach out into the world of 
things". 
 
A second example of extended functionalism is Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) account of the ‘extended mind’. The point of that 
argument (which I shall not rehearse again today) was to show 
that external memory traces may sometimes be poised for the 
control of action in very much the same kind of way as internal 
memory traces, yielding an extended supervenience base for 
dispositional beliefs. The claim here was not, implausibly, that an 
external, passive, encoding might somehow behave exactly like 
the fluid, automatically responsive resources of internal biological 
memory. Rather, it was that external encodings were, under 
certain circumstances, capable of becoming so deeply integrated 
into online strategies of reasoning and recall as to be only 
artificially distinguished from proper parts of the cognitive engine 
itself. The argument thus echoes Ballard et al’s in depicting a 
larger integrated system as the extended machinery whose 
computationally salient states, properties and transformations are 
supposed to explain specific problem–solving performances.  
 
Or consider an accountant who is extremely good at dealing with 
long tables of figures. Over the years, she has learnt how to solve 
specific classes of accounting problem by rapidly scanning the 
columns, copying some numbers onto a paper scratchpad, then 
looking to and from those numbers (carefully arrayed on the page) 
back to the columns of figures. The accountant (let’s call her Ada) 
does this at lightning speed, and by deploying a variety of minimal 
memory strategies. Instead of committing complex dependencies 
to biological memory, Ada follows trails through the numbers, 
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creating external traces every time an intermediate result is 
obtained. These traces are in turn visited and re–visited on a ‘just 
in time, need to know’ basis, moving specific items of information 
into and out of short term bio–memory in much the same way as a 
serial computer shifts information to and from the central 
registers in the course of carrying out some computation. This 
process may again be best analysed in extended functional terms, 
as a set of problem–solving state–transitions whose 
implementation happens to involve a distributed combination of 
biological memory, motor actions, external symbolic storage, and 
just–in–time perceptual access. 
 
R.Wilson’s (2004) notions of ‘exploitative representation’ and ‘wide 
computation’ capture the key features nicely. Exploitative 
representation occurs when a sub–system gets by without 
encoding some piece of information, in virtue of its ability to track 
that information in some other way. Wilson gives the example of 
an odometer that keeps track of how many miles a car has 
traveled not by first counting wheel rotations then multiplying 
according to the assumption that each rotation= x meters, but by 
being built so as to record x meters every time a rotation occurs: 
 
“ In the first case it encodes a representational assumption 
and uses this to compute its output. In the second it contains 
no such encoding but instead uses an existing relationship 
between its structure and the structure of the world” Wilson 
(2004) p.163 
 
Wilson’s descriptions and central examples can make it seem as if 
exploitative representation is all about achieving success without 
representations at all, at least in any robust sense of 
representation. But this need not be so. Another, very pertinent, 
range of cases would be those in which a sub–system does not 
contain within itself a persisting encoding of certain things, but 
instead leaves those encodings in the world (or in some other sub–
system to which it has access). In this kind of case, the larger 
system may well contain genuine symbolic encodings, consistent 
with the sub–system merely exploiting (rather than 
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recapitulating) these during problem–solving activity. The case of 
Ada, described above, would be a case in point. Ada’s biological 
brain does not create and maintain persistent encodings of every 
figure she generates and offloads onto the page, though it may 
very well create and maintain persistent encodings of several 
other key features (for example, some kind of running 
approximation that acts to check for gross errors). In much the 
same way as Ballard’s block–puzzlers, Ada's biological brain may 
thus, via the crucial bridging capacities of available embodied 
action, key its own internal representational and internal 
computational strategies to the reliable presence of the external 
pen–and–paper buffer. Even robustly representational inner 
goings–on may thus count as exploitative insofar as they merely 
form one part of a larger, well–balanced process whose cumulative 
set of state–transitions solves the problem. In this way: 
 
“explicit symbolic structures in a cognizers 
environment...together with explicit symbolic structures in 
its head [may] constitute the cognitive system relevant for 
performing some given task” Wilson (2004) p.184 
 
The sense of constitution here in play is not, however, the strong 
sense of "being conceptually intertwined with" but the weaker 
(though still interesting and important) sense of "as it happens 
being part of the apparatus that implements".  
 
The use of various forms of exploitative representation 
immediately yields a vision of what Wilson dubs ‘wide 
computationalism’, according to which “at least some of the 
computational systems that drive cognition reach beyond the 
limits of the organismic boundary” (op cit p.165). Wide 
computationalism, stressing at it does the many interactive 
processes that span brain, body and world, is also intrinsically 
dynamics–friendly. Many of the internal representational states 
invoked will be fleeting, generated on–the–spot, delicately keyed 
to making the most of other closely coupled internal and external 
resources. Extended functionalism is thus not in any way 
committed to their being static symbols in the head. On the 
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contrary, it invites us to locate static, classical–looking symbol 
structures where they belong: out in the world, but making a deep 
and abiding contribution to online thought and reason 
nonetheless. 
 
Once again, the point is not to defend this specific suggestion, so 
much as to locate it in the wider space of options. The key 
features, for these purposes, are that extended functional systems 
may include motor behaviours as processing devices, and 
environmental structures as storage and encoding devicesxv. Such 
bodily and worldly elements emerge as genuine parts of extended 
computational regimes, and are apt for formal description in both 
dynamical and information–processing termsxvi. The larger 
systems thus constituted are, as Wilson insists, unified 
computational wholes such that “the resulting mind–world 
computational system itself, and not just the part of it inside the 
head, is genuinely cognitive” (op cit p.167). Insofar as such a 
thesis is correct, the cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind who 
chooses to treat the brain and central nervous system alone as the 
mechanistic supervenience base for mental states is rather like a 
neuroscientist who insists that neuroscience proper should not be 
concerned with the hippocampus or the cerebellum, because (they 
think) all the real cognizing goes on in the cortex, even if (they 
concede) those other structures sometimes play a role in the 
transmission and routing of information and control.  
 
Extended functionalistsxvii thus reject the image of mind as a kind 
of input–output sandwich with cognition as the filling (for this 
picture, and more arguments for its rejection, see Hurley (1998)). 
Instead, we confront an image of the local mechanisms of human 
cognition quite literally extending out into the world. But just as 
the traditional machine functionalist was interested in neural 
goings–on as the contingent means by which human beings 
manage to implement a particular functional organization (since it 
is the functional organization itself that then bears some 
constitutive relation to our mental states) so the extended 
functionalist sees the body as the contingent bridging mechanism 
that allows us to implement some larger functional organization, 
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that in turn may bear some conceptual or constitutive relation to 
our mental states. 
 
 
We are now in a position to bring out the potential tension 
between EF and CCC: a tension somewhat obscured by the 
common use of the notion of embodiment. For while embodiment 
and embedding play a crucial role in each kind of story, the nature 
of that role is often rather different. Thus, the accounts mentioned 
in section 2 seem to depict bodily form and/or knowledge of 
sensorimotor contingencies as elements that make a direct and 
constitutive contribution to human thought and reason. While the 
accounts mentioned in section 3 depict bodily action as providing a 
contingent bridge for the emergence and maintenance of larger 
functional wholes spanning a wider computational, dynamical, 
and representational nexusxviii. What counts, for mind, cognition, 
and mental states, according to these latter models, is that overall 
processing economy itself.  
 
To dramatize the difference, recall Shapiro’s opposition to the idea 
that “the same kind of mind can exist in bodies with very distinct 
properties” (Shapiro (2004) p.175). On the basis of the kinds of 
evidence described in section 2 above, Shapiro rejects the idea that 
“snakelike organisms and creatures of science fiction” (op cit 174) 
might share our kind of mind. If the theorists of embodied 
cognition are correct, Shapiro suggests, Body Neutrality (the idea 
that “characteristics of bodies make no difference to the kind of 
mind one possesses” (op cit p.175)) is false. 
 
It should be clear, however, that something has here gone by a 
little too swiftly. For imagine now a case in which we have two 
intelligent beings. One of them is a snake–like creature lying on 
top of an advanced touch–screen like environment. In this flat–
screen setting every little wriggle of the snake can cause specific 
external symbolic tokens to appear elsewhere on the screen: 
tokens that are themselves apt for perceptual uptake (perhaps via 
a kind of Braille). The snake–being (call it Adder) uses this set–
up, let us suppose, to implement the same extended accounting 
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algorithm as Ada in our earlier example. According to EF  there is 
no reason to suppose (at least from anything we have said so far) 
that the accounting–relevant cognitive states of Ada and Adder 
need differ in any respect. Each implements the same extended 
computational process, and even (we may suppose) divides the 
biological and non–biological contributions in the same way.  
 
More radically, but still consistent with EF, we may even imagine 
that there are differences at the level of what gets done where. 
Enter Odder. Odder performs certain computations internally that 
Ada and Adder both perform using action and perception routines 
in the non–biological arena. Here too, the EF theorist is at liberty 
to believe that the very same cognitive and mental states might be 
being implemented, with nothing distinguishing the cases apart 
from some non–essential matters of location. Just as, for the 
standard approach, we need not care (within sensible limits) 
exactly where within the brain a given operation is performed, so 
too (it might be urged) we should not care whether, in some 
extended computational process, a certain operation occurs inside 
or outside some particular membrane or metabolic boundary. 
 
Odder is by no means a duplicate in the sensory arena, and the 
distribution of operations varies widely between Odder, Ada, and 
Adder. Moreover, the distribution varies in ways that criss–cross 
the perceptual/non–perceptual divide. Yet there is a strong (full-
bloodedly) functionalist intuition that considered as a form of 
'accounting intelligence', Odder, Adder and Ada form a 
computational equivalence class.  
 
Returning to Shapiro's argument we can now see that, looked at 
from the perspective of EF, it  mistakenly moves from: 
 
(1). Bodily structures and action routines can be key 
participants in extended information–processing routines. 
 
to 
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(2). Bodily structures and action routines play a special role 
such that sameness of mental state requires sameness of 
bodily structure and action routine. 
 
The spirit of EF, it seems to me, is precisely to reject (2) by 
stressing overall systemic integrity at the expense of any special 
role for the contributions of body, brain, or world. Fans of CCC, by 
contrast, may think that EF fails to do justice to what matters 
most about the body and action, and that they are simply 
repeating an old functionalist mistake in a new (extended, 
distributed) setting.  
 
4. Remedies for the Flesh? 
 
There is, I have argued, a potential tension at the very heart of 
the program so easily (so unitarily) glossed as the study of 
“embodied, embedded cognition”. It is the tension between an 
extended, dynamics–friendly, version of good old fashioned 
functionalism, and something more fundamentally fleshy: the idea 
that features of the body (including characteristic patterns of 
embodied action) make a direct and in some sense profound or 
constitutive contribution to mind and mentality. My goal in the 
present treatment has been simply to expose this tension in as 
clear a way as I can. I’d like to end, however, with a brief sketch of 
some possible steps towards a resolution. 
 
One quick way to relieve the tension would be to argue that the 
body makes a direct and constitutive  contribution to conscious (or 
perhaps just to conscious perceptual) experience but not to 
cognition considered more generally. Thus Ada, Adder and Odder 
may indeed all implement the very same accounting algorithm, 
but the differences in embodiment will (on this account) 
necessarily make a difference at the level of their conscious 
experience. The wild card in this whole debate is thus our old 
friend phenomenal experience itself. Thus consider Shapiro’s 
observation that: 
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“The instructions by which the human brain computes 
relative depth do not work in creatures with eye 
configurations other than those in a human being. This is 
the sense in which depth perception is embodied. The 
procedures by which human beings perceive depth– a fact 
about human psychology– are contingent on a fact about 
human bodies” Shapiro (2004) p.188 
 
Recall that from facts such as these, Shapiro concludes that 
“human vision needs a human body” (op cit p.189). Such a claim 
is, however, importantly ambiguous. It might mean only (1) that 
the brain’s own algorithms factor in the opportunities provided by 
bodily structures and action. It might mean (2) that being able to 
make the kinds of gross visual discrimination that we can make 
requires having exactly the same kind of body (in respect of eye 
configuration at least) as we do. But this claim is surely false, 
since an alternative distribution of the very same information 
processing steps, in some differently–brained and differently 
bodied being, must be capable of implementing that very same 
algorithm (as EF is frequently at pains to point out)xix. Or it might  
mean (3) that any such alternative implementation need not 
preserve the qualitative feel of human depth perception: a 
qualitative feel that is somehow tied not to the running of a 
certain abstract algorithm but to the use of two eyes located a 
certain distance apart.  
 
The quickest reconciliation, then, is to treat the body or sensory 
apparatus as itself making some special kind of contribution, one 
that cannot help but impact (in non–trivial ways) certain 
qualitative aspects of our mental life. This is probably the best 
way to understand Noë 's assertion that "the character of our 
experience depends on…idiosyncratic aspects of our sensory 
implementation" (op cit p.26). If you think that the sensory 
implementation plays a unique role that contributes directly to 
experiential content, you may very well think that every 
difference in implementation makes a real (though perhaps 
vanishingly small) difference to the felt nature of the experience 
itself. In this way, you get both to be a kind of functionalist 
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(arguing that it is the role of the physical structures in mediating 
patterns of sensorimotor contingency that matters) and to assert 
that (for perceptual experience at least) every difference in certain 
aspects of physical implementation makes a difference.  
 
It is by no means obvious, however, that we can stably reconcile 
any recognizable form of functionalism with such full–and–
principled sensitivity to all the details of a being's embodiment 
and/or sensory apparatus. For a broadly functional (or even just a 
broadly computational and representational) view of the 
underpinnings of perceptual experience demands, it seems to me, 
that it be in principle possible that two beings could be different in 
respect of gross sensory apparatus and embodiment and yet, 
courtesy perhaps of compensatory differences in key aspects of 
downstream processing, end up realizing the same set of 
experience–determining functionally specified state–transitions. 
Noë (2004) (and also O'Regan and Noë (2001)) seem to leave no 
room for this even as a bare possibility. Noë is explicit that "to see 
as we do, you must…have a sensory organ and a body like ours" 
(Noë (2004) p.112, italics in original)xx.  
 
Perhaps this is right, and experience is non–trivially permeated 
by the full details of biological embodiment. My own view (see e.g. 
Clark (1999) (2001): see also Jacob and Jeannerod (2003)) is that 
this is unlikely to be true. Experience, in presenting us with a 
world fit to engage by action and by reason, need be sensitive only 
to certain aspects or features of the sensorimotor contingencies 
our embodiment dictates. Broader skill–based approaches have 
more room for maneuver here, as we saw briefly in section 2 
above. By simply identifying experiences with implicit knowledge 
of the full suite of contingencies defined at the sensorimotor 
surfaces, the strong sensorimotor account leaves no room for 
compensatory downstream adjustments to yield identical 
experiences despite surface dissimilaritiesxxi. Nor does it leave 
room for small differences at the sensorimotor surfaces to be such 
as to make no experiential difference, courtesy of failing to deliver 
any salient differences in signals to downstream processors. 
Perhaps, that is to say, downstream processing provides a kind of 
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grid relative to which certain differences at the level of the 
sensory inputs (and associated contingencies) simply fail to make 
a difference. But whatever the cognitive scientific niceties, the 
point for present purposes is just that no global reconciliation 
between EF and the strong sensorimotor model looks likely, since 
the latter depicts the sensorimotor dynamics alone as fixing, with 
extreme sensitivity, the nature of our perceptual experience. This 
forecloses the possibility of the same experience being brought 
about in some other sensorimotor context in virtue of the details of 
a larger functional organization (or, contrariwise, of a different 
perceptual experience being brought about, despite sameness of 
sensorimotor contingencies, in virtue of some larger functional 
organization). 
 
A related worry threatens at least the strongest versions of Lakoff 
and Johnson's claims concerning the tight links between forms of 
embodiment and basic conceptual repertoires. For what embodied 
experience actually delivers as the baseline for learning and 
metaphorical thought surely depends on some complex mixture of 
bodily form, environmental structure and (possibly innate) 
downstream internal processing. Here too, compensatory 
adjustments in either of the two non–bodily arenas look likely to 
make available forms of thought and reason that are not tethered 
in any simple way to the gross bodily bedrock.  
 
For these reasons, I think it would be unwise to opt for a global 
reconciliation according to which bodily form and sensorimotor 
patternings play a profound or constitutive role in the 
determination of all forms of conscious perceptual experience. 
Instead, we should try, on a case–by–case basis, to understand the 
body as playing an enabling computational role: one that 
selectively impacts both conscious and non–conscious cognitive 
strategies. In this way we may hope to explain, for a variety of 
specific cases, just why and how the body matters, without making 
the body matter mysteriously or simply in and of itself.  
 
One obvious place to start is by observing that for many  
information processing problems, there will be an elegant, 
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representationally low–cost, solution that is in several important 
senses relative to the gross physical properties of the 
implementing apparatus. To borrow an example that I have used 
before, an industrial solution to the problem of fitting together 
small highly engineered parts may be built around the provision 
of flexible rubber mountings for the assembler arms. The 'bodily' 
structure here reshapes the information processing required. 
Subtract the rubber mountings and the best solution involves the 
repeated computation of multiple visual feedback loops to guide 
repeated attempts. But with the rubber mountings in place, the 
system gives along two spatial axes, and even roughly visually 
guided parts fall into place ""just as if millions of tiny feedback 
adjustments to a rigid system were being continuously computed" 
(Michie and Johnston 1984 p.95). 
 
Similar effects sometimes flow from the concrete details of sensor 
placement. A system with a certain spatial distribution of sensors 
for heat or light will not need to deploy multiple steps of inference 
to determine whether certain signature patterns are present or 
absent. Moreover, the fixed relations between bodily–mounted 
sensors obviate the need to constantly determine how input at 
point X relates to input at point Y. Such relations may be either 
constant (as between two fixed eyes) or else vary systematically 
(where X and Y are independently controllable or moveable, as in 
the case of the left and right index fingers). In either case, the 
properties of the body keep the sensory inputs in a certain kind of 
alignment, and this invariant can be simply assumed (rather than 
explicitly represented) by the algorithms that use the sensory 
inputs as sources of problem–solving information. 
 
The body is also the point at which willed action, if successful, 
first impacts the wider world. This sounds trivial, but is actually 
profoundly important. When conjoined to the observation that, in 
the typical human case, these points of willed action include all 
our voluntary sensor movements, it yields the intuitive 
understanding of the body as the common and persisting locus of 
sensing and action. Extensive work on the technologies of 
telepresencexxii suggests that the human sense of presence, of 
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being at a certain place in space, is fully determined by our ability 
to enter into closed loop interactions, in which willed sensor 
motions yield new sensory inputs, and by our ability to act upon at 
least some of the items thus falling within sensory range. The 
phenomenological sense in which we typically 'inhabit' (rather 
than painstakingly control) our own bodies is determined by the 
fluency with which we control the sensors and actuators in ways 
that enable successful interaction to occur. 
 
Insofar as our general sense of presence in the world is so 
determined, it should come as no surprise that our sense of being 
oriented in the world (e.g of seeing the world right way up or 
upside down) is also tightly synched to our capacities for (or 
better, our dispositions towards) successful fluid sensorimotor 
engagements. The most convincing cases for constitutive motor 
involvement in perceptual experience were all seen to fall within 
this limited class: the class of phenomenal contents relating to 
orientation, location and presence. 
 
Finally, the body, by being the immediate locus of willed action, is 
also the gateway to intelligent offloading. The body is the primary 
tool for the intelligent use of environmental structure (see Kirsh 
(1995) and acts as the mobile bridge that allows us to use  the 
external world in ways that simplify and transform internal 
problem–solving. The body is thus the go–between linking these 
two different (internal and external) sets of key information–
processing resources. The body's role in such cases is that of an 
instrument enabling the emergence of a new kind of information–
processing organization. This role may, without too much 
exaggeration, be likened to that of the corpus callosum. Both are 
key physical structures whose cognitive role is in part to allow 
distinct sets of resources to engage in highly integrated forms of 
problem–solving activity. 
  
In these closing comments I have been speaking as if the body is, 
just as it happens, the locus of willed action, the point of 
sensorimotor confluence, the gateway to intelligent offloading, and 
the stable (though not permanently fixed) platform whose features 
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and relations can be relied upon in the computation of certain 
information–processing solutions. But in fact, I am inclined to go 
further and to assert not just that this is what the body does, but 
that this (or some list quite like it) is what, at least for all 
cognitive scientific purposes, the body is. I am inclined, that is, to 
identify the body with whatever plays these roles in a unified 
information–processing economy.  
 
The immediate upshot of this is that the body, insofar as it is 
cognitively significant, turns out to be itself defined by a certain 
complex functional role. Notice also that nothing here requires a 
single persisting body in ordinary 3-space. Instead, there could be 
genuine but scattered forms of embodiment, embodiment in 
virtual or mixed realities, and multiple embodiments for a single 
intelligence (for more on these topics, see Clark (2003) (In Press) 
(Jenann (ms) (forthcoming)). It is merely a contingent (and 
increasingly negotiable) fact about human embodiment that the 
body is both the metabolic centre and the bridge to sensory 
presence and intelligent action. In exotic casesxxiii, the metabolic 
center is detached from the more cognitively important loci for 
sensing, acting and intelligent offloading: loci that collectively 
determine our sense of presence in the world.  
 
A deeper resolution of the apparent tension between EF and even 
the more sweeping forms of CCC is now in sight. For the cognitive 
importance of the body, if this is on the right track, is fully 
exhausted by its ability to play a certain functional role in an 
intelligent organization. The distinctiveness and importance of 
this role is what explains the intuition that the body makes a 
special and quite pervasive cognitive contribution. But because it 
is nothing but a complex functional role, there is nothing 
cognitively significant about the bodily contribution that is not 
fully captured by reflection upon its several (and potentially 
separable) computational and information–processing 
contributions.  The body is special. But we should understand its 
specialness through the familiar lens of our best information–
processing models of mind and cognition.  
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6. Conclusions: The Body's Balancing Act 
 
There is a certain tension, or so I have argued, between two 
strands of thought prominent in the recent literature on the 
embodied, embedded mind. One of those strands depicts the body 
as intrinsically special, and the details of a creature’s embodiment 
as a constitutive, or at any rate profound and abiding, constraint 
on the nature of its mind. The other depicts the body as just one 
element in a kind of equal–partners dance between brain, body 
and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall 
balance thus achieved. This is a kind of extended functionalism 
(now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than 
ever before).  
 
One possible resolution of this tension is to display the body as (for 
all cognitive purposes) nothing but the item, or items, that play a 
certain complex functional role in an information–processing 
economy. Within such an economy, mental sameness is indeed 
determined by the overall balance achieved using neural, bodily 
and environmental resources. The body plays a special (but 
plainly instrumental) role in determining and stabilizing this 
balance and as such it is a key player on the cognitive stage.  
 
There is, however, an important sub–class of cases in which our 
dispositions for embodied action may plausibly be depicted as 
playing a strongly constitutive (not merely instrumental) role. 
These are the cases concerning space, orientation and presence. 
This class may yet be extended by new skill–based models that 
look beyond the sensorimotor surfaces, discerning a constitutive 
involvement for various acts of recognizing, grouping and 
tracking. We have found no reason, however, to suppose that in 
any of these cases mental sameness requires gross bodily 
sameness.  
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* Thanks to Michael Wheeler,  Jenann Ismael, David Chalmers, Mark 
Rowlands, and Rob Wilson for useful comments during the early 
stages of this project. 
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i A very modest sampling might include Thompson, Varela and Rosch (1991),  Clark 
(1997), Haugeland (1998),  Hurley (1998), Clark and Chalmers (1998),  Rowlands 
(1999),  Lakoff and Johnson (1999),  O'Regan and Noë (2001), Shapiro (2004), Wilson 
(2004), Noë (2004), Gallagher (2005). For some critiques, see Adams and Aizawa 
(2001),  Grush (2003). It should go without saying that many if not all of the key ideas 
have longer and much more varied pedigrees. For a brief survey of these historical roots, 
see Clark (1997) chapter 8, section 8. 
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ii I first heard the paper at an Academia Sinica meeting in Taipei in 1993. It appeared in a 
volume following that meeting (Yu–Houng Houng and Jih–Ching Ho (eds) (1995). The 
version quoted in the present text is the one found in Haugeland (1998). 
 
iii Consider, by way of analogy, the familiar claim that memory is (wholly or partially) 
constitutive of personhood. We can distinguish this interesting, venerable (though 
probably false) idea from the less interesting observation that memory is often causally 
implicated in the development of persons. The latter is surely true, while the former is 
thrown into doubt by the many thought experiments (and indeed real-world cases) in 
which memory and personhood seem to come apart.  For some classic discussion, see 
Parfit (1984). 
 
iv An exception to this rule is R.A. Wilson (2004) 
 
v  For this reason, Clark and Chalmers (1998) dub their position ‘active externalism’.  
 
vi Shapiro (2004) distinguishes claims concerning body–specificity, claims concerning 
the role of language and metaphor, and claims concerning tool–based cognitive 
extension. 
 
vii Shapiro’s larger project is to attempt to undermine the Multiple Realizability Thesis 
(MRT) according to which the very same mind could exist in many different physical 
incarnations. The argument proceeds via two steps. First, he argues that MRT implies that 
we should not in general be able to predict properties of the brain from properties of the 
mind. Second, he tries to show that such predictions are in fact possible (for example, 
there are reasons to think that many details of wiring and placement of neural structures 
are highly constrained by what those structures are required to do), and thus concludes 
that MRT is false. The details of these arguments will not concern us today. It is perhaps 
ironic, though, that at least some of the kinds of story that Shapiro appeals to later in the 
book, as part of his subsequent argument for the importance of specific  bodily forms to 
specific kinds of mind turn out to exemplify a kind of extended functionalism, and thus 
threaten (or so I shall later suggest) to increase, rather than reduce, the opportunities for 
multiple realizability of mental states. 
 
viii For example, sensory modalities are said to be "constituted by distinct patterns of 
sensorimotor contingency" (op cit p.943), as is "the qualitative character of experience" 
(p.960), "looking round" (p. 968) "perceived color" (footnote 20 p.972) and ultimately 
perception itself ( p.1020). In their reply to Block (p.1015), the authors note that, at least 
insofar as qualitative experience is concerned, it is not the sensorimotor contingencies 
themselves that are meant to play the constitutive role but "the perceiver's exercise of 
mastery of laws of sensorimotor contingency" (p.1015). This is important for 
distinguishing their view from the hardline behaviorist reading offered by Block, and is 
the reading assumed throughout the present treatment. 
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ix It is tempting to think that any conceptual intertwining must actually be of some much 
more general kind, for example that some or other knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies is inevitably implicated in all forms of perceptual experience, but that the 
very same experience may, in differently embodied beings, be implemented by different 
bodies of knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. Nothing in the text, however, seems 
to suggest such a weakened reading. 
 
x That there is something potentially problematic about this argument is evident in the 
tension between the easy use of a common notion of happiness and sadness in the first 
quoted sentence and the subsequent assertion that happy and sad would then ‘assume 
different meanings’. But the point, in any case, is simply that arguments stressing the 
pervasive influence of embodiment on conceptualization look to be arguments for UC, 
since they assert the ineliminable involvement of bodily details in an account of mental 
states.  
 
xi Recent work on the complex relations between affect and embodiment (Damasio 
(1994) (1999)) might seem to establish just such a direct link. But here too we need to 
proceed with some caution. For the question is not whether or not gross bodily states and 
processes play some important role in the determination of mental states, but whether 
specific details of embodiment play a profound or constitutive role. One test for this is to 
ask whether a creature lacking a certain kind of body could nonetheless enjoy those very 
same mental states. This is the question to which Shapiro, Noë and O’Regan, and Lakoff 
and Johnson (all for very different reasons) all seem to answer ‘no’. Sameness of (at least 
some) mental states, they believe, requires sameness of key features of embodiment. 
Damasio’s answer to this question is, however, unclear. The body matters, for Damasio, 
insofar as low–level bodily responses provide a set of ‘somatic markers’ that afford a 
kind of compact summary of previous experiences able to impact choice and reasoning in 
important and often unsuspected ways. Somatic markers thus require there to be some 
body or other in the loop. But they do not look to require the presence of a body of any 
specific type. 
 
xii Thus:  "For two systems to have the same knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies all 
the way down they will have to have bodies that are identical all the way down (at least in 
relevant respects). For only bodies that are alike in low-level detail can be functionally 
alike in the relevant ways" (O'Regan and Noë (2001), p.1015) 
 
xiii I use ‘bodily’ here to refer to the gross physical body, excluding the brain and central 
nervous system. 
 
xiv Inimical to, but not inconsistent with. ST is said to be logically independent of MRT 
(Multiple Realizability Thesis) since “it is logically possible that a mind could be realized 
in a number of different kinds of structure, but that all of these structures are contained in 
similar sorts of bodies (and) it is logically possible that there is only one or a few ways of 
realizing a humanlike mind but that these few types of realizations can exist in many 
different sorts of bodies” (Shapiro (2004) p.167). Such concessions make the intended 
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force of the earlier arguments depicting physical structures as proper parts of 
psychological processes unclear, though Shapiro does add that he is willing to bet that “if 
there are but a few ways to realize a humanlike mind, probably there are but a few kinds 
of bodies that could contain such a mind’ (op cit p.167). 
 
xv Concerning memory, for example, Wilson writes: 
 
“Memory…does not simply stop at the skin but involves engaging with the world 
through cognitively significant, embodied action…Remembering, on this view, 
involves exploiting internal, bodily and environmental resources in order to 
produce some sort of action…” 
Wilson (2004) p.191 
 
 
xvi The idea that dynamical approaches are incompatible with computational and 
representational ones is increasingly recognized as a mistake, even by those working at 
the very heart of the dynamical systems movement: see e.g. Spencer and Schöner (In 
Press). 
 
xvii For example Wilson (2004), Clark (1997), Clark and Chalmers (1998), Dennett 
(1996), Donald (1991), and Hutchins (1995) all count as extended functionalist 
treatments according to the present usage. 
 
xviii P.M. Churchland (2005) argues at length that functionalism is a theory that science 
and philosophy have now outgrown. I am not convinced, however, that the critique is 
sufficiently sensitive to the very possibility laid out in the present text viz that the most 
persuasive form of functionalism depicts many of the relevant functional organizations 
(especially those pertaining to higher-level human cognition) as implemented not by the 
biological brain alone but by hybrid systems encompassing brain, body, world and action.  
 
 
xix Thus consider FLICKER. Flicker is a creature with just one eye that moves very 
rapidly from side to side of its face. Perhaps with some canny tweaks of the neural 
control and downstream sensory post–processing circuitry, such a being could 
nonetheless implement precisely the same basic depth perception algorithm as ourselves. 
The situation would be not unlike the use of a fast serial computer to simulate a parallel 
processing device.  
 
xx Such an account makes it in principle impossible for a differently embodied being to 
fully share human perceptual experiences. In this vein, the account has been accused 
(Clark and Toribio (2001)) of a kind of ‘sensorimotor chauvinism’. Noë (2004, p.26–28, 
and p. 113) rejects the charge of unacceptable chauvinism arguing that while every 
difference in sensorimotor contingencies must indeed make some slight difference to 
perceptual experience, there is plenty of room to allow that differently embodied beings 
may enjoy sufficiently similar experiences for each to count as, say, visual.  It should be 
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noted that Noë can allow different surafec features to yield the same experience (as when 
we adapt to inverting goggles: the 'bodily' surface is now altered but the experience 
normalizes after a while. What he does not allow (and see note 21 below) is that bodily 
differences that impact sensorimotor contingencies can be reconciled with full sameness 
of experience. Every such difference, for Noë, makes a difference. 
 
xxi Thus Noë (personal communication) does indeed assert that "you couldn't have the 
very same experience unless you have the same underlying sensorimotor exercise". This 
may turn out to be true, but it is not yet obvious to me why it must be true, or how we can 
at this time know it to be true. 
 
xxii For a review, see Clark (2003) chapter 4 
 
xxiii For a famous meditation on this theme, see Dennett (1981). 
